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INTRODUCTION
Under the "priority doctrine" of water law embedded in the constitutions of many western states, each water right has a priority date attached to it.' In Colorado, the rights with earlier priority dates ("senior
rights") have seniority in the allocation and usage of surface and
groundwater.! State law considers water rights property that the right
owner can lease or sell; further, the priority attaches to the right when
it is traded
In the South Platte Basin of Colorado, many surface diversions allocated for irrigation use date back to the mid-19th century.4 They are,
thus, quite senior. If low stream flows prevent senior fights from diverting the water to which they are entitled, the seniors can put a "call"

* Professor Emeritus of Economics and Senior Scholar, Environment & Society
Program, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado-Boulder. The author
wishes to thank Lawrence (Larry) J. MacDonnell for many insights into water law and
the nature of water rights.
1. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §5 (declaring all water in the streams of the
state of Colorado as property of the state).
2. Coffin, et al v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446 (1882) (recognizing prior
appropriation system in Colorado instead of common law riparian system); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-92-101, et seq. (incorporating groundwater withdrawals into prior appropriation system).
3. City and County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 840 (Colo. 1939).
4.

NEIL S. GRIGG,

PoLITcs, 58 (2003).
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on the river, requiring all upstream rights 'Junior" to the caller to stop
diverting water until adequate streamflow is restored.'
Following World War II, well drilling exploded in the alluvial valleys of the West, based on improved pump technology, cheap energy
and the absence of regulatory frameworks over wells.6 In the South
Platte River Basin of Colorado, irrigators tapped into the huge aquifer
tributary to the South Platte River with thousands of wells that provided a reliable and handy source of water.' During the same period,
developments in hydrologic science made clear the connections between river flows and tributary aquifers.8 For example, hydrologists
demonstrated that well pumping could deplete streamflows.9
With this new knowledge of river-aquifer linkage, Colorado's 1969
General Assembly decided the priority system should incorporate wells
tapping the tributary aquifer, awarding priorities according to the date
of first use.'" This statute, the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, attached priority dates to the tributary wells, making the wells very junior in priority in their respective basins." It thus
appeared that the state would prohibit use of tributary wells during
periods of low stream flow, for example during prolonged droughts,
just when the huge store of groundwater would be most valuable.
To avoid this clearly uneconomic result, the 1969 Act allowed the
State Engineer to approve temporary "substitute water supply plans,"
or augmentation plans, that would allow junior wells to continue
pumping when there was a call on the river as long as the well owners
could augment surface flows to make up for current shortages attributable to their current and past pumping - a calculation requiring detailed models." The augmentation must make up for any potential
injury to seniors." The Act cited numerous ways to augment the injury
that would be caused by their pumping, including "pooling.. .water
resources or water exchange projects...."'

Under these arrangements,

Water Court Division One permanently approved 2,800 South Platte
wells that continued to operate; Division One also permitted several
5. See Colorado Division of Water Resources, "Water Rights Terminology" available
at http://water.state.co.us/wateradmin/terms.asp.
6. See, e.g. Colorado Division of Water Resources, Republican River Compact Administration Ground Water Model, available at
http://water.state.co.us/wateradmin/republicanriver/rrca-model.pdf (noting the
increase in groundwater pumping in the Republican River basin after World War II).
7. LawrenceJ. MacDonnell, Colorado's Law of Underground Water: A Look at the South
Platte Basin and Beyond, 59 U. COLO. L.REV. 579, 604 (1988).

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id at 581.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 588; see also C.R.S. § 37-92-101 (2008).
MacDonnell, supra note 7, at 588.
Id. at 589; COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-302 (2008).
MacDonnell, supra note 7, at 589.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-103(9) (2008).
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hundred wells to operate temporarily while applications to the Water
Court for permanent plans were pending."
During the 197 0's, 1980's and early 1990's, generous stream-flows
meant that calls on the river were generally confined to July and August, requiring only limited well augmentation.'" As the drought of the
early 2000's became increasingly severe, surface water shortages led to
increasingly frequent calls on the river, with almost continuous calls
from 2002 to 2006. 7 This meant that the wells that had been operating
under "substitute water supply plans" had to provide much larger volumes of augmentation water if they were to continue pumping and
had to scramble for increasingly costly surface rights or leases.'" Most
were unsuccessful. The State Engineer shut down more than 400 major
wells in the early summer of 2006 through 2007, drying up 30,000 acres
of cropland with immediate, severe impacts on the farms and associated rural communities. 9 A second effect of the frequent calls on the
river was that many water users in addition to the wells in question had
to stop diverting water from the South Platte system.2 ' A later section
assesses those impacts.
I. DIRECT ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE WELL SHUT-DOWN
The 1969 Act provided for out-of-priority well pumping because of
the value of groundwater during droughts. 2' The requirement for
substitute water supply plans protected downstream water uses. 22
Therefore, it makes sense to compare the economic losses related to
the shut-down with the consequential benefits to parties downstream of
the wells. For this assessment, one needs to ask the following questions: (a) how much of the surface shortage that led to the calls was
15. See Hal Simpson, Address at the State Engineer's Office Forum, "History of Well
Regulation, South Platte Basin" (Sept. 6, 2006), outline available at
http://water.state.co.us/pubs/presentations.asp.

16.

Id.

17. SouTH PLATTE RIVER TASK FORCE BRIEFING DOCUMENT, WELL REGULATION
SouTH PLATrE RIVER BAsIN OF COLORADO 5 (June 2007) available at
http://www.colorado.gov (search "South Platte Briefing Document").

18.

IN THE

Simpson, supranote 15.

19. Press Release,.City of Boulder, City Responds to South Platte Well Shutdowns
(May 19, 2006), availableat

http://www.ci.boulder.co.us/index.php?option=com-content&task=view&id=5179&Ite
mid=2526.
20. Id.
21. See generally Kathleen A. Miller, Lawrence J. McDonnell, Steven L. Rhodes,
GroundwaterRights in an Uncertain Environment: Theoretical Perspectives on the San Luis
Valley, 33 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 727, 748 (1993) (explaining that valuable groundwater is
pumped after droughts and that Colorado did not regulate such pumping until the

passage of the 1969 Act).
22.

See generally COLO.

REV. STAT.

§ 37-92-308 (2008) (clarifying State Engineer's

authority to approve substitute water supply plans).
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actually attributable to the wells' current and past pumping and, thus,
how much augmentation should the substitute water supply plans require?; (b) what would be the time profile of increased flows downstream resulting from the cessation of pumping?; (c) how does the
present value of future income losses incurred by well owners and linked
activities compare with the present value of future downstream benefits
that would be gradually generated by the increased stream-flows?
Regarding the 2006 surface shortages that occasioned the continuing calls, some estimated that past pumping of the 445 wells caused
out-of-priority depletions of 15,000 to 16,000 acre-feet.2 3' However, other causes of the surface shortage were also at work including the lingering effects of drought, upstream cities increasing water reuse, and water users changing irrigation practices from flooding to sprinklers.
Thus, even had the wells been able to meet their augmentation requirements on a continuing basis, calls would still have occurred, but
less frequently. In a similar situation on the East Snake Plain Aquifer
in Idaho, the Idaho State Engineer commissioned a study that found
that well pumping, drought and changes in irrigation techniques contributed equally to the surface shortages.25
When the wells were shut down, seasonal farm incomes were immediately lost because crops had been planted but had not matured. 6
Direct farm income losses were estimated to be $390 per acre, while
total direct and indirect income losses were estimated at $690 per
acre.2 ' These losses will continue into the future until the state permits
the wells to operate. In contrast, downstream benefits from the increased water supplies would occur only gradually over several years as
the water table recovered and stream-flows increased.28 In addition,
downstream gains would be only marginal additions to farm income
since downstream agriculture was not totally dependent on South

23. City of Boulder, Issue Points on South Platte Wells (Nov. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.ci.boulder.co.us/files/Utilities/Projects/s-platte-factsheet.pdf.
24. SOUTH PLATE RIVER TASK FORCE BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supranote 17, at 11.
25. DONALD L. SNYDER AND ROGER H. COUPAL, ASSESSMENT OF RELATVE ECONONC
CONSEQUENCES OF CURTAILMENT OF EASTERN SNAKE PLAIN AQUIFER GROUND WATER

IRRIGATION RIGHTS at vii (February 2005), available at

http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/Committee/ESPA%20Economic%2Study%2OFeb%2020

05.pdf.
26. Jerd Smith, 'Tough News' Dooms Crops, Rejected Proposal Would Have Let Farmers
Start Wells, ROcKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, June 3, 2006, at 4A.
27. JENNIFER THORVALDSON AND JAMES PRITCHETT, COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY,
COLORADO WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS OF
REDUCED IRRIGATED ACREAGE IN FOUR RIVER BASINS IN COLORADO 34 (December 2006),

availableat http://www.cwi.colostate.edu/publications/cr/207.pdf.
28.
See, e.g. SNYDER AND COUPAL, supra note 25, at xviii (noting gradual increase in
downstream benefits on Eastern Snake River).
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Platte flows.' The cropping patterns in the well areas and the benefiting downstream areas are roughly similar."
For these reasons, the present value of losses of income due to the
well shut-down logically must exceed the present value of direct downstream gains from eventual increases in flows. In the similar Idaho situation referenced above, the present value of losses to well owners
called out by surface users was vastly greater than the present value of
the gradual gains to the surface and spring water users, even though
the latter included the largest trout farms in the United States.'
H. THE EFFECTS OF THE RIVER CALL
The calling rights on the South Platte were very senior and located
far downstream on the Platte in the northeastern part of the State."' As
a result, the 2006 call included many upstream juniors in addition to
the wells, resulting in substantial additional losses to those water users." The call included the cities of Greeley, Boulder, Englewood,
Westminster and Highlands Ranch, along with several irrigation
ditches and water districts. 4
The City of Boulder (upstream of the wells) estimated the value of
its foregone diversions in 2006 to be at least $100,000 depending on
how Boulder would have used the water, either by leasing it to farmers
at $25 per acre-foot if the water was in surplus or by having to pay for
make-up water to be imported from the Colorado Basin at a cost of
about $100 per acre-foot.3 5 The losses of other towns involved would
have similar values per acre-foot.
Therefore, the aggregate losses
from the call were substantial. 7
29. SOUTH PLArTE RIVER TASK FORCE BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 17, at 10 (noting that only 1.4 million of the annual 4 million acre-feet surface water diversions come
from the native flow of the South Platte river).
30. At least one study is underway to determine the validity of this assumption, at
least in terms of changes in cropping patterns when irrigated land is fallowed. See
JENNY THORVALDSON AND JAMES PRITCHETT, ECONONUC IMPACTS OF REDUCED IRRIGATED

AGRICULTURE IN EASTERN COLORADO: A SUMMARY OF THREE STUDIES 2,

available at

http://water.usgs.gov/wrri/O5grants/progress.completion-reports/CO/2005CO 115B.
pdf.
31. SNYDER AND COUPAL, supra note 25, at 51-52.
32. See Dick Wolfe, Asst. State Engineer, Regulation of Well Pumping in the South
Platte River (Oct. 7, 2005) availableat
http://water.state.co.us/pubs/presentations/dwolfeOO7705-b.pdf (noting that rights
in the northeastern part of the state have priority dates in the 1880s and 1890s).
33. Colorado Supreme Court, Notice of Appeal by Harmony Ditch et al, May 3,
2006
34. Id.
35. Carol Ellinghouse, Boulder Water Utility, personal email regarding the South
Platte wells, Oct. 26, 2006.

36.
37.

Id.
Id.
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The remaining question is, "How will the well shutdown affect the
frequency and/or duration of future river calls?" Answering that question would require complicated hydrological and climatological analysis and the effects would spread over several years as the aquifer
reached a higher level. The resultant reduction in the frequency and
duration of calls would, to some degree, result in lower losses to the
other junior water users - a benefit of the shut-down. However, because factors other than the wells reduce river flows, the shutdown will
not avoid calls altogether - therefore, one must judge the net effect of
the shutdown as a substantial economic loss.
III. ARE RIVER CALLS UNECONOMIC?
Calling parties are unlikely to take into account the losses to affected juniors. Indeed, it is difficult for a calling senior to identify the
juniors the call will affect.38 The famous "Coase Theorem" suggests
that upstream losers could organize to pay the downstream calling party to "subordinate" their priority if upstream losses exceed those of the
downstream caller. 9 Such organization seems unlikely at a large basin
level."° Thus, there is a presumption that river calls will result in economic losses.
The underlying priority-efficiency conflict occurs because there is a
low correlation between water right priorities and the values (net incomes) those rights generate." Agriculture controlled most early uses
of water, and many of the senior rights remain in agriculture in spite of
a century of water market activity.4" Senior right holders are still applying water to low marginal value uses in agriculture while urban, industrial and environmental rights typically have lower priorities because of
their recent establishment." However, if there were a stronger correla38. It is the responsibility of each right holder to monitor the status of the river
with respect to river calls.
39. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-44
(1960) (describing how effective allocation of property rights can improve efficiency of
transactions). In short, if the costs of bargaining and enforcement of agreements are
low, resources will be efficiently allocated even in the absence of competitive markets
and regardless of the initial distribution of rights or bargaining power. See PAUL
MILGROM AND JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 300-301

(1992).
40. Id. Coase's examples of his theorem depend on the effective interrelation of
the economic actors involved. It is unlikely that the economic actors in a market as
large as the South Platte River could achieve this level of organization through market
forces alone.
41. See THORVALDSON AND PRTCHETr, supra note 27, at 14 (noting agricultural production represents 0.84% of the total economic activity in the South Platte basin).
42. Kristin Choo, Litigation Won't End the Battles Over Depleted Water Resources
in Several Regions of the United States (2008), A.B.A.J.,
http://abajournal.com/magazine/gulp
43. Id.
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tion between seniority and economic value ("seniority-value correlation"), then the high-value holders would make fewer calls, perhaps
none at all.
The challenge is to find ways within existing water laws to increase
the seniority-value correlation. This should be the mission of our water
markets: to shift higher priorities towards higher value uses.
IV. IMPROVING WATER MARKETS TO MATCH PRIORITIES AND
VALUES
Making the water transfer process less costly and time-consuming
(i.e., reducing transaction costs4 ) would reduce the frequency of economically inefficient calls because there would be greater motivation to
move lower-value-producing rights to higher-value-producing uses. 45
Sellers could get higher returns and buyers would have to pay less. The
western states, especially Colorado, have had active water markets for
over a century. 6 It should be the goal to make these markets as efficient as possible.
In Colorado, transfers of water rights and plans for augmentation
go through water court review and approval in which the court certifies
various dimensions of the right (e.g. historic consumptive use, timing
of use) so that the water court can condition the transfer on no injury
to other water users." Court review frequently requires costly legal and
engineering studies by buyer and seller.4 In Idaho, Wyoming, and New
Mexico, the Director of Water Resources, the Water Board, or the State
Engineer carries out this review. 9 These agencies have the needed
expertise in-house, thereby reducing the costs of legal representation
and expert witnesses.5' The Supreme Court of Idaho recently ruled
that the Idaho State Engineer has broad authority to approve plans for
well augmentation and can exercise flexibility in designing those arrangements in keeping with consideration of the general public welfare: "Somewhere between the absolute right to use a decreed water
right and an obligation not to waste it and to protect the public's inter-

44. Charles W. Howe, Carolyn S. Boggs and Peter Butler, Transaction Costs as Determinants of Water Transfers, 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 393 (1990).
45.
Megan Hennessy, Colorado River Water Rights: Property Rights in Transition, 71 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 1661, 1664 (2004).
46. Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Changing Uses of Water in Colorado: Law and Policy, 31
Ariz. L. Rev. 783 (1989)
47. COLO. REV.STAT. § 37-92-302 (2008).
48. LAWRENCE J. MAcDONNELL, ET AL., WATER BANKS IN THE WEST, 4-2 (Natural Resources Law Center 1994).
49.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-1411 (2008); Peggy Sue Kirk, Cowboys, Indians and Reserved Water Rights: May a State Court Limit How Indian Tribes Use Their Water?, 28 Land &
Water L. Rev. 467, 488 (1993); Howe, supra note 44, at 400.
50.
Id.
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est in this valuable commodity, lies an area for the exercise of discretion by the Director."5'
In Idaho, a factor facilitating water transfers and augmentation
plans is that the Department of Water Resources, in cooperation with
the University of Idaho, has created a surface water-groundwater computer model that all stakeholders have broadly accepted for use in analyzing alternative plans and policies." Broad authority for the State
Engineer Office and broad acceptance of the standard model combine
to reduce transaction costs and facilitate trades.
"Water banks" are arrangements through which buyers, sellers, and
leasers can quickly execute short-term leases and permanent transfers. 3
Water banks have a long history in Idaho, California, Arizona and Colorado. 4 In Colorado, the General Assembly has authorized water
banks for all major basins. 5 A pilot water bank Colorado authorized in
2002 for the Arkansas River failed to generate transactions partly because of long delays in the review process that ruled out useful shortterm reallocations. Quick agriculture-to-agriculture, agriculture-tourban, and urban-to-agriculture leases can be highly beneficial. Again,
Idaho utilizes a variety of types of water banks and rental pools that
facilitate quick water transfers. 57
There are other steps that would reduce transactions costs of transfers. More complete public records of ownership of rights and the
prices at which transfers occur would help in increasing the efficiency
of water markets. 8 Potential market participants have difficulty in
identifying each other and in knowing what "the going price" should

51.

American Falls Reservoir District v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 154 P.3d 433, 451

(Idaho 2007).

52.

Donna M. Cosgrove, & Gary S. Johnson, Aquifer Management Zones Based on Simu-

lated Surface Water Response Functions, 131J. of Water Resources Planning and Mgmt. 89,

99 (2005).
53. Kathleen A. Miller, Managing Supply Variability: The Use of Water Banks in the
Western United States, in DROUGHT: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT VOLUME III 70-86 (D.A. Wilhite
ed., 2000), availableat http://www.isse.ucar.edu/water-climate/banking.html.
54. Charles W. Howe, Water Markets in Colorado:Past Performanceand Needed Changes,
in MARKETS FOR WATER: POTENTIAL AND PERFORMANcE 65, 66 (K. William Easter, Mark
W. Rosegrant and Ariel Dinar ed., 1998).
55.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80.5-104.5 (2008).
56. JOHN D. WIENER, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY PROGRAM, INSTITUTE OF BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE, UNrERSITY OF COLORADO-BOULDER, PROBLEMS WITH THE ARKANSAS RIVER BASIN
WATER BANK PILOT PROGRAM, 1 (2008),

http://www.colorado.edu/ibs/eb/wiener/papers/One-pagersJulyO8_5.pdf
57. Idaho Water Supply Bank,
http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/waterboard/water%20bank?waterbank.htm (last visited

Oct. 10, 2008).
58.

Hennessy, supra note 45, at 1664.
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be in a particular area ("price discovery") .5 The Arkansas River water
bank experience indicated that market participants had little idea of a
reasonable price. ' Various market forms are available to establish
market-clearing prices, e.g. the sealed bid-double auction procedure
that maximizes benefits from transfers, but even simple "bulletin
board" markets have also proved effective.'
These ideas received recognition in the report of the South Platte
Task Force ("SPTF"). The Colorado Governor appointed the SPTF in
2007 and charged them with finding efficient and equitable ways of
resolving the South Platte conflicts.' Their recommendations recognized that streamlining water court procedures would facilitate transfers and plans of augmentation." They further emphasized the potential for water banks, along with other transfer mechanisms that could
substitute for traditional "buy and dry" permanent transfers.
Eventually, the correlation between water right priorities and values generated will continue to increase through the functioning of our
water markets, but the South Platte basin is losing large possible benefits-especially in drought years-by failing to facilitate both temporary
and permanent transfers. Water transfer reform remains a priority issue.

59. Charles W. Howe, Innovations in Water Management: lessonsfrom the Colorado-Big
Thompson Project and Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, in ScARCE WATER AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 171, 191 (Kenneth D. Frederick ed., 1987).
60. Wiener, supra note 56.
61. MacDonnell, supra note 48, at 4-16; Howe, supranote 59, at 187, 191.
62. Letter from the Colorado Department of Natural Resources to Gov. Bill Ritter
4 56 7
.
(Sept. 30, 2007). http://www.dnr.state.co.us/newsapp/press.asp?PressId=
63. Id.
64. Id.

